

# **FORCE SELECTION FOR OBTAINING LODGMET IN A MOOTW ENVIRONMENT**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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Securing lodgment at an airfield in an environment where it is uncertain whether the introduction of military forces will be opposed during a military operation other than war poses a difficult problem for planners of military operations. Forcible entry is a combat mission to wrest control of a lodgment cite from an opposing force. These operations use the principles of mass, surprise and overwhelming combat power to secure the point of entry and facilitate the rapid introduction of additional military forces. Unopposed entry to an airfield to secure lodgment can be achieved less aggressively with less provocative means. Landing a security force at the airfield appears benign compared to either airborne assault or air assault techniques. However, in an uncertain environment, the tension between security of the force, restraint and legitimacy provides operational planners a problem in risk management. The method selected for insertion of the entry force telegraphs the intent of the mission, whether combat, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping. This study evaluates initial lodgment plans and operations in Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY against the principles of war and operations other than war.

LODGMNT URGENT FURY  
PRINCIPLES UPHOLD DEMOCRACY  
MOOTW PLANS AND OPERATIONS

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
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
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
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## I. INTRODUCTION

The United States' post Cold War national security strategy stresses the need to remain engaged in world affairs across all elements of national power. However, it cautions that "Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference."<sup>1</sup> Stressing preventative diplomacy, economic assistance, overseas military presence and military to military contacts, the current national security strategy rests heavily on the military's ability to successfully conduct missions that are doctrinally grouped as military operations other than war (MOOTW).<sup>2</sup>

U.S. national military strategy envisions two complementary objectives that support the national security strategy. They are activities that promote stability through regional cooperation and constructive interaction, and activities that thwart aggression through credible deterrence and robust war fighting capabilities.<sup>3</sup> "The challenge of the new strategic era is to selectively use the vast and unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance national interests in peacetime while maintaining readiness to fight and win when called upon," is how General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sums up the future facing military professionals.<sup>4</sup>

For institutions charged with defense of the nation, focusing on missions that do not directly involve prosecuting or deterring war is difficult. Despite the change in focus, the U.S. military has a long history of nation building and nation support operations. From providing stability on the frontier while the country expanded to the west to helping the rebuilding of civil institutions in the vanquished countries following WW II, the U.S.

military has helped build nations as well as prosecute America's wars. Today, in the same way the military historically conducted operations other than war, military operations contribute to the development and support of democratic governments around the world. These missions bolster the U.S. foreign policy that places support of democratic institutions as an important national security interest. The current administration continues the American heritage of supporting democratization and is justifiably proud in stating in the national security strategy that all Western Hemisphere governments are democratic except for one hold out, Cuba.<sup>5</sup> Until 1994, this was not the case. However, by pursuing a consistent foreign policy, backed by strong and proven military capability, the United States supports and bolsters the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions.

The United States routinely demonstrates its ability to deploy forces and conduct military operations that support legitimate democratic governments. In the 1980s and 1990s, when democratic institutions were threatened or subverted in Grenada, Panama and Haiti, the United States intervened with military force to restore legitimate authority. For the threat of invasion to be credible, the U.S. military requires the capability to forcibly enter a country and establish a lodgment to facilitate follow-on military operations. The most recent operations of this type were done in Grenada in 1983 (Operation URGENT FURY), and in Panama in 1989 (Operation JUST CAUSE). The capability to conduct forced entry operations was also available for Haiti in 1994 (Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY).

Operations URGENT FURY in Grenada and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti illustrate tactical planning scenarios where conditions were ambiguous for whether forcible

entry to an airfield required airborne assault operations or whether permissive entry would allow forces to airland at the airfield. In Grenada, the plan called for the bulk of the entry force to airland unopposed. The decision to conduct an airborne assault rather than airland the majority of the entry force was made while the aircraft were enroute to their objective. The delays and confusion caused by the change in entry mode was a recipe for disaster had resistance been stronger at Point Salines airfield.

By contrast, in Haiti the primary method for insertion of the entry force was airborne assault at Port au Prince International Airport. The decision to conduct permissive entry into the country occurred while formations of paratroop laden aircraft were enroute to the drop zones. They were turned back to their departure bases, reconfigured from warfighters to peacemakers and were sent back to Haiti. Waiting in the waters off the coast of Haiti was an additional task force assigned the mission of conducting unopposed entry into Haiti. Operation URGENT FURY had plans to use the same force for both forcible entry and permissive entry options. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY employed separate task forces dedicated to either the forcible entry option or the permissive entry option. Both operations were ultimately successful though different techniques for securing lodgment were used.

The parallels between Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY are evident at the strategic and the operational levels. Each established the strategic goal of deposing the de facto governments and to replace them with constitutionally elected government. In each operation, the U.S. military was opposed by an unpopular government hostile to the intentions of the U.S. government. For each operation the United States did not have military basing rights in country.<sup>6</sup> To conduct



each operation, U.S. forces needed to first establish a lodgment. A significant difference between the two operations is the selection and use of military forces for the initial operational phase to secure lodgment.

The United States military retains the ability to conduct military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Currently, more of its effort is placed on military operations other than war (MOOTW). The current emphasis on MOOTW does not change the initial requirement for all military operations where no U.S. forces are forward based—the need to establish a secure base in the area of operations. The contrast between Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY provides insight into the types of forces, the missions that should be assigned to each force and the methods that are available to enter a country when it is uncertain whether entry will be opposed in a MOOTW environment.

## **II. METHODOLOGY**

By examining the entry plans and operations of two case studies, Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and by applying current joint and service doctrine, this paper attempts to answer whether the same forces can be used to secure lodgment for either permissive or forcible entry operations. Neither operation was considered a war, rather they were interventions sanctioned by a regional security organization or the United Nations. In today's doctrine, they were both military operations other than war (MOOTW). Joint Pub 3-07 definition of MOOTW is “the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. The military

actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.”<sup>7</sup>

While both Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY were successful, they contrast the U.S. military's ability to plan and conduct operations in areas where no U.S. forces are present. The similarities between the operations are numerous. Both operations were extensions of U.S. military power into unstable societies and required forces to deploy from the continental United States by ship and by air. In each scenario the objective area was a Caribbean island nation within proximity to U.S. bases on Puerto Rico, Cuba and Southeastern United States. In both cases permissive entry was not certain and therefore establishing lodgment required an airhead or beachhead. Both plans included the option for an airfield seizure if entry was opposed.

For both operations, planners had three options to consider to enter the objective area and initiate operations: amphibious assault, airborne assault or airland. In Grenada, a combination of all three options was employed although the same task force had to contend with airborne assault and airland options for insertion with priority given to the airland option. In Haiti, both airborne assault and the airland options were planned, but separate task forces were assigned to each contingency: one force for the forcible entry option the other for an unopposed entry option.

Where URGENT FURY was executed from a crisis action plan, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was deliberately planned, rehearsed and executed. Operation URGENT FURY required an airborne assault to secure lodgment while the threatened airborne assault in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was sufficient to allow unopposed entry. In Grenada, a Ranger Battalion was given the task to secure the airfield; in Haiti, a

division of paratroops was given the same task while another division was poised to enter the airfield unopposed. Operation URGENT FURY relied on stealth and surprise to attain a lodgment, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY relied on the threat of overwhelming force.

Grenada is a Caribbean island nation just north of Venezuela. It is a member of the British Commonwealth and has been independent since 1974.<sup>8</sup> From independence until 1979, Grenada's first Prime Minister was Sir Eric Gairy. Gairy's administration was characterized by corruption, brutality and authoritarianism.<sup>9</sup> Aligned with Chile, South Korea and the Duvalier regime in Haiti, Gairy attempted to strengthen his hold on power during his tenure through repression of any political opposition.<sup>10</sup> His regime was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Maurice Bishop, of the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation Movement Party (NEW JEWEL) on 13 March 1979. A Leninist communist, Bishop turned to Cuba and the Soviet Union for economic and military support.<sup>11</sup> Bishop was never in full control of the leadership of the NEW JEWEL Party. His deliberate method for changing the political culture on Grenada was too slow for a faction of the party. The movement split in 1983 over the pace of communist reform. The schism became intolerable and Bishop was murdered on 19 October 1983 during a governmental coup led by the People's Revolutionary Army.<sup>12</sup>

Planning for what became Operation URGENT FURY began on 19 October 1983 at the prompting of a Joint Chiefs of Staff warning order to Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT), Admiral Wesley McDonald, for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) of U.S. citizens on Grenada on 19 October 1983. Upon direction from the President, through the National Security Council, planning continued through 22 October.

Originally conceived as a unilateral Navy-Marine operation, the Army and the Air Force were latter included since there were multiple objectives to secure on the island to evacuate U.S. citizens safely. The combined service joint task force operation of Marines and Rangers reinforced by the 82nd Airborne Division was designated Joint Task Force-120 (JTF-120) and was commanded by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, III.<sup>13</sup> JTF-120's operational scheme was hastily planned in five days.

Based on the premise that the operation on Grenada was a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) planners envisioned a Marine amphibious landing on the northern half of the island to secure Pearls airport and an Army Ranger operation on the southern half of the island to conduct the NEO from the new airport under construction at Point Salines. The American students were at the medical school campus at True Blue and their evacuation appeared straightforward. However, Navy SEALs were also involved in the operation to evacuate the Governor General Sir Paul Scoon from the capitol, capture the radio station, and free the political prisoners from the Richmond Hill Prison. All three tactical objectives, the Marine landing, the seizure of Point Salines airfield and the SEAL missions, were executed independently. Once they were complete, two airborne battalions would be flown in to secure the island and complete the NEO, while the Rangers and Marines withdrew. The entire operation would be complete when the island was pacified and under the control of a 350 man Caribbean peacekeeping force. At that point the airborne battalions would withdraw.<sup>14</sup>

The purpose of the Grenada operation was primarily to evacuate American citizens from the island. During the planning phase of Operation URGENT FURY, military planners were uncertain whether the entry of U.S. forces would be opposed. Additionally,

the condition of the airfield under construction at Point Salines was not known. These two factors forced planners to consider an airborne assault to secure and clear the airfield. The concept of an airborne assault does not necessarily equate to forcible entry. Forcible entry is defined as "a military operation to enter an area against opposition."<sup>15</sup> Airfield seizure, on the other hand, is an operation "executed to clear and control a designated airstrip. The purpose can be to allow follow-on airland forces to conduct transload operations or to establish lodgment in order to continue combat operations from that location."<sup>16</sup> Ideally, the operation at Point Salines Airfield would be an airfield seizure. The airland delivery of U.S. troops provided immediately available airlift aircraft for the noncombatants' evacuation. If opposed, a contingency plan provided the option to airborne assault at the airfield. That option became the one executed and the operation became a forcible entry because the resistance encountered by the runway clearing team was heavier than expected.

Operations on Grenada placed emphasis on tactical objectives: seize the airfields, evacuate American citizens and restore civil order. The overriding strategic objective for conducting Operation URGENT FURY was to sever Grenada's political ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union, a concern of the United States intelligence and military communities.<sup>17</sup> However the link from strategic objective to tactical execution was not clear. The stated objectives for the operation were "To protect the lives of U.S. citizens; and to help Grenada re-establish order so that Governmental Institutions and Human Rights can be restored, thereby contributing also to the maintenance of regional peace and stability."<sup>18</sup> Its strategic significance, however, was the close association with Cuba and the Soviet

Union being established by the Grenadan government under the NEW JEWEL party and the access that association provided to the strategically located runway at Point Salinas.<sup>19</sup>

Operation URGENT FURY was based on the 1981 exercise OCEAN VENTURE, in which paratroops, Rangers and Marines, along with special forces conducted a forcible entry NEO in the Caribbean.<sup>20</sup> For URGENT FURY, Point Salines airfield was designated the port of debarkation and embarkation. Securing Point Salines was the mission of two battalions of Rangers, a total of 600 men. Following the airfield seizure by the Rangers, the Division Ready Brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division would airland at the airfield and establish the airhead.<sup>21</sup> Preceding the Rangers and the 82<sup>nd</sup> DRB was the joint airborne advance party (JAAP) consisting of four Air Force combat controllers and twelve Navy SEALs.<sup>22</sup>

The JAAP was to depart the United States on the afternoon of 23 October and parachute from C-130 aircraft into a water dropzone near the USS Clifton Sprague. At the dropzone were two 23 foot Boston Whaler boats for infiltration to the island by the advance party. The mission of the JAAP was to proceed in the motorboats to the shore of Grenada, scout the airfield, install navigation beacons and monitor the weather for the forthcoming airborne assault by one company of Rangers. The reconnaissance was to be completed during the night, and precede the airborne assault by at least 24 hours. During daylight hours of 24 October, the party was to hide and wait for the Ranger assault at H-hour, 0200 on 25 October.<sup>23</sup>

The first attempt to insert the JAAP was unsuccessful. The winds aloft at the time of the airdrop were 25 knots causing rough sea conditions and a hazard to the parachutists safety. As a result, four SEALs drowned after becoming hung up in their

gear. High seas caused the remainder of the force to abort their mission and return to the USS Clifton Sprague. Insertion of the JAAP was again attempted the following evening. It too was unsuccessful for the same reasons. The impact of these two setbacks was to delay H-hour from 0200 to 0500 on the 25 October.<sup>24</sup>

The first company of Rangers was to parachute into Point Salines Airfield, secure and clear the airfield and prepare to receive follow on airland missions 30 minutes later to close the remaining Ranger force with their jeeps, other vehicles and equipment.<sup>25</sup> The planned 0200 airborne assault provided surprise and security by catching the opposing force unaware. Three and one half hours was initially allotted for the Ranger company to clear the runway, secure objectives and airland the remaining Ranger force. Once both Ranger Battalions were on the ground with their initial objectives secured, they were to prepare to transfer the airfield security mission to the Division Ready Brigade of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division. The 82<sup>nd</sup> was to airland at Point Salenes at H plus 4 hours beginning at 0600 on 25 October. Additional C-141 airland missions would close the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division throughout the day and evacuate U.S. citizens and designated Grenadians from the island.<sup>26</sup>

The delay in H-hour from 0200 to 0500 caused subsequent delays in follow on missions.<sup>27</sup> The first parachute assault was now scheduled for dawn, with the airland closure of the Ranger force in daylight. Ten MC-130 special operations aircraft and three AC-130 gunship aircraft were required for the airborne assault and airland missions at Point Salines. Despite the delay, the plan remained the same for only one company tasked to parachute into the airfield to secure it for the follow on airland missions bringing in the remainder of the assault force.

An hour and one half prior to the rescheduled 0500 H-hour, an AC-130 gunship on a reconnaissance mission to Point Salines, and carrying the Ranger pathfinder group that would precede the airborne assault force, relayed that the runway was obstructed. As previously planned, the Ranger pathfinder group jumped from the AC-130 into the airfield using high altitude, low opening (HALO) military freefall procedures at 0330 hours. Their mission was to prepare the jump zone and the landing zone for the main body.<sup>28</sup> This was the only element of the JAAP that arrived at the airfield prior to the assault.

The obstructions on Point Salines airfield included construction vehicles and metal spikes driven into the runway.<sup>29</sup> Because of these obstructions, both battalions, except vehicle drivers, would have to airborne assault into the objective. While all aircraft were configured with parachutes for the Rangers onboard, only one company of Rangers, whose primary mission was to conduct the airborne assault, was rigged for airdrop. The remaining Rangers and the Air Force combat control team were not loaded or prepared prior to departure for airdrop and needed to rig their parachutes in flight. Restricted by vehicles and equipment, normal rigging and jump procedures were not used.<sup>30</sup> In addition, since the decision was made for the both Ranger battalions to parachute into the objective while the force was enroute to the objective, the relay of mission change was done via the aircraft radios by the pilots of the aircraft. Not all the aircraft got the change in order. In three aircraft the Rangers continued to believe that they would airland until twenty minutes out from the scheduled landing.<sup>31</sup>

At 0530, three and one half hours after the original H-hour, the formation closed on the airfield and began receiving anti-aircraft artillery fire. The lead aircraft was forced to abort the pass because of navigation equipment difficulties. Since the lead aircraft was



in clouds, the pilot did not attempt a lead change with his wingman because of concern for the safety of the aircraft and elected instead to lead his wingman through the aborted the run. The third aircraft was now in lead position. Descending to below 500 feet above ground level the pilot of the third aircraft initiated the drop of elements of the 1/75<sup>th</sup> Rangers into a hot DZ. The remaining nine troop carrying aircraft orbited outside the vicinity of the airfield and waited while the AC-130s provided suppressive fire aimed at the anti aircraft artillery at the airfield. During the intervening period, the Rangers completed in-flight rigging of their parachutes and prepared for the airborne assault. The next airdrop did not begin for an additional twenty minutes. Beginning at 0534, the airdrops lasted until 0700 when the last group of the ten C-130s crossed the drop zone.<sup>32</sup>

At 0800, the airfield seizure was complete and the Rangers moved on to their follow on NEO objectives. Originally scheduled to arrive at 0600, the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division did not begin arriving until 1405. Interspersed within the arriving aircraft carrying the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division was the CARICOM peacekeeping force.<sup>33</sup> Neither the CARICOM forces nor the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division had clear intelligence of what to expect upon arrival in Grenada. The first twelve C-141s carrying the lead elements of the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division were configured for airborne assault operations as a precaution by the Division Commander.<sup>34</sup> However an airborne assault was not required when 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division forces began arriving at Point Salines airfield even though there was still resistance near the airfield.<sup>35</sup> The mission for the Airborne Division was to relieve the Ranger Battalions and enable the transfer of peacekeeping duties to CARICOM forces. And as the peace enforcers began arriving, so too did the peacekeepers.

Operation URGENT FURY was completed in nine days despite synchronization problems associated with the establishment of the lodgment. Had resistance been stronger, things may have turned out quite differently. The execution of Operation URGENT FURY caused intense Congressional reflection on the makeup and organization of the U.S. military. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 caused sweeping change in the operational routines of the armed services. Emphasis on service cooperation and operational control of forces by theater commanders in chief fostered greater "jointness" in military terms, doctrine and focus. Perhaps more important, however, was the growing awareness of the operational level of military operations. Eleven years after URGENT FURY, a similar operation to secure lodgment was required.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was the military intervention in Haiti in 1994 to restore President Jean Bertrand Aristide to power as President of Haiti. Execution of entry operations during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY were remarkably smooth when compared to Operation URGENT FURY. Operation URGENT FURY was executed from a crisis action plan, though the concept for the plan was exercised during Exercise OCEAN VENTURE 1981. Unit personnel turnover, however, insured that few participants in Operation URGENT FURY had practiced the operation. Conversely, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was deliberately planned and rehearsed with the forces that would conduct the operation.

Haiti is a tortured Caribbean country sharing a border with the Dominican Republic. Its history is a long series of conflict, martial law and dictatorial rule. Political stability for the nation appeared to arrive on 16 December 1990 when Father Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected President. On 7 February 1991 Father Aristide assumed

office as the first democratically elected President in Haitian history.<sup>36</sup> But on 30 September 1991 he was overthrown in a military coup led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. Aristide fled to the United States and began working with human rights officials for his eventual return to power. At Governor's Island New York on 3 July 1993, diplomats from the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS) brokered an agreement between Cedras and Aristide for Aristide's return as the President of Haiti by 30 October 1993.

Anticipating Aristide's return, the U.N. and the U.S. deployed a peacekeeping force on board the USS Harlan County with the mission to observe the transition and implementation of President Aristide's return to Haiti. On 11 October 1993 the ship was turned away from the dock at Port au Prince by a paramilitary mob.<sup>37</sup> This event made it clear to the United States that implementation of the Governor's Island Accords would require military pressure and Joint Task Force 180 (JTF-180) was established at Fort Bragg, NC.<sup>38</sup>

Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY occurred eight years after passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. From the outset it was planned in a joint environment with tactical commanders and staffs.<sup>39</sup> Operational planning focused on the link between strategic and operational objectives. The National Command Authority worked through the theater commander, to a single joint task force commander, rather than indirectly through the joint and service staffs. This provided a clear chain of authority and command and contributed to the unity of effort prior and during the intervention.

Planning for the operation that became UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was initiated as two distinct parallel plans. OPLAN 2370-95 was the forcible entry option planned first, while OPLAN 2380-95 was for permissive entry.<sup>40</sup> Eventually variants of each plan were considered for entry into Haiti. Initial lodgment was planned to be established at Port au Prince International Airport in each plan, however entry force units and method were different for each operation.

Initial planning for OPLAN 2370-95 commenced 1-12 November 1993 with all service components participating. Their primary objective was to develop a "campaign level" concept of operations.<sup>41</sup> JTF-180 (Joint Task Force-180) was established for execution; organized around the XVIII Airborne Corps, JTF-180 was commanded by LTG Henry "Hugh" Shelton, Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps. The plan's premise that intervention would be resisted required forcible entry and combat operations that would precede a U.S. led peace enforcement mission.<sup>42</sup> A small and compartmented planning cell began work on the concept and campaign plan to restore democratic government to Haiti through the fall and winter of 1993-1994. Campaign objectives were to neutralize the FAD'H, protect Haitian lives, reorganize the FAD'H and the police, assist transition to the legitimate government and redeploy U.S. troops back to the United States.<sup>43</sup> Completed with time phased force deployment data, it was submitted to CINCUSACOM in February 1994 and updated in June 1994.<sup>44</sup>

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY came from the base prepared by OPLAN 2370-95. In the plan, the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division played the central role in an airborne assault at Port au Prince International Airport. It included an initial assault force of

approximately 8000 soldiers aboard nearly 100 C-141 and C-130 aircraft, and required a total force package of approximately 27,000 soldiers.<sup>45</sup> It was also a U.S. only operation.

From its inception, planners knew the military mission was an operation to restore order, as defined in draft Joint Pub 3-07.3. General Cedras' intransigence to restoring President Aristide to power coupled with U.N. dissatisfaction with the conditions that existed in Haiti provided the backdrop for U.S. military operations. In May 1994, President Clinton released his administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations. The policy states the factors the President will weigh when considering whether the U.S. will be involved in U.N. peace operations. Notably, the Haitian scenario meets six of the eight criteria. A concern for military planners was whether the operation was peacekeeping (U.N. Charter Chapter VI military operations) or peace enforcement (U.N. Charter Chapter VII military operations).<sup>46</sup> Forcible entry was the first method for entering Haiti considered for securing lodgment. Since it anticipates armed resistance, it comes under U.N. Charter Chapter VII rules of engagement.<sup>47</sup> While the operational design originally focused only on the forcible entry option, it latter grew to include permissive entry of U.S. forces that provided the opportunity to conduct a less aggressive U.N. Chapter VI peacekeeping operation with commensurate rules of engagement.<sup>48</sup>

These political developments drove planners to also consider an unopposed entry option. OPLAN 2380-95 was drafted in ten days by USACOM staff in June 1994. It was designed as the permissive entry option into Haiti of multi-national forces. On 1 July 1994 USACOM directed the standup of JTF-190 for the planning of a multi-national, interagency option and made the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (LI) the principal force for its implementation.<sup>49</sup> Planned in parallel to OPLAN 2370-95, OPLAN 2380-95 was a

permissive entry option of U.S. and multi-national forces into Haiti. It was to be less aggressive but like OPLAN 2370-95 it required rapid force buildup in the area of operations.

JTF-190 was commanded by MG David Meade, Commander, 10th Mountain Division.<sup>50</sup> The plan's concept was to air assault two infantry battalion size forces from the USS Eisenhower to Port au Prince International Airport. They would be flown by elements of the 10th Aviation Brigade from an aircraft carrier over a three day period with the initial mission to secure the airfield and port. Designed to coordinate a consolidated cooperative of multi-national coalition and non-governmental organizations, this insertion method was "just aggressive enough to protect the force."<sup>51</sup>

OPLAN 2380-95 had the same objectives as OPLAN 2370-95, however the method for entry and the conditions for its use were different. It was intended to be aggressive but not provocative, it included coalition forces, the initial assault force was only 400 soldiers with a total force of 14,000 (roughly half of the force required by OPLAN 2370-95).<sup>52</sup> Initial plan development was completed by 8 July 1994, seven days after JTF activation.<sup>53</sup> By this plan, the first forces into Haiti would air assault at Port au Prince International Airport from an aircraft carrier located just off the coast of Haiti. The forces required in the plan were both Army and Navy and its execution required special liaison and training for the Army helicopter pilots operating from a Navy aircraft carrier. Beginning in late July, the 10<sup>th</sup> Aviation Brigade of the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division began planning and training for operations to support OPLAN 2380-95.<sup>54</sup>

On 2 September 1994, USACOM ordered a third option for entry into Haiti.<sup>55</sup> This option was to provide the forcible entry of OPLAN 2370-95, followed by the rapid

air assault of the forces employed in OPLAN 2380-95. This option, known as OPLAN 2380(+), was a merger of both force deployment lists and preserved the option for either forcible entry or unopposed entry for the task force commander.<sup>56</sup> It employed both the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne forces embarked on C-141 and C-130 aircraft departing from the United States and the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division forces embarked on air assault helicopters from the aircraft carrier. In the event forcible entry was needed, JTF-180 would airborne assault at Port au Prince International Airport followed by air assault by JTF-190. If entry was unopposed, JTF-180 would airland at Port au Prince International Airport followed JTF-190 who would air assault into the airport. Deploying this large a force met the requirement to attain all the initial security objectives identified by the JTF commander: secure the airfield and the port, assess security of U.S. citizens, establish a theater strike force, and protect the forces as well as the civilian populace.<sup>57</sup>

Execution of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY followed the plan outlined in OPLAN 2380(+). On 18 September 1994, a diplomatic delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter with Senator Sam Nunn and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell conferred in Haiti with General Cedras. Their mission was to convince Cedras to relinquish power in accordance with U.N. Resolution 940. While they were conferring, JTF-180 is prepared to depart for the airborne assault at Port au Prince International Airport. H-hour was set for 0401Z on 19 September (0001 local time). With forces airborne and enroute to the objective area, the Carter delegation achieved its objective for General Cedras to relinquish power and not resist U.S. and multi-national forces. CINCUSACOM canceled the airborne assault order and issued new orders for execution of OPLAN 2380(+) with new arrival time of 1300Z (0900 local

time).<sup>58</sup> JTF-180 returned to CONUS bases, reconfigured, and embarked again for Haiti, this time as the security force for JTF-190 forces for the unopposed entry of the peace enforcement contingent. Events on the morning of 19 September followed according to the new plan with JTF-180 beginning to airland at Port au Prince International Airport at 0902 local and JTF-190 forces arriving at 0930 local.<sup>59</sup>

Securing lodgment is a necessity for military operations where no U.S. or allied military forces are forward based. Future operations requiring a lodgment may be planned under conditions of uncertainty whether entry will be opposed or unopposed. Assigning the task to secure lodgment under either condition may be unproductive and produce effects that are detrimental to the operation. To evaluate whether the same force should be planned for use for both opposed and unopposed entry operations in a MOOTW environment, analysis of the two case studies will focus on the joint principles of MOOTW: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance and legitimacy; selected U.S. Army operational principles of war: mass, surprise and simplicity;<sup>60</sup> and forcible entry considerations as highlighted in draft pub FM 90-xx--overwhelming force, synchronization, time and surprise/deception.<sup>61</sup>

### **III. DOCTRINE**

Military doctrine is the compilation of underlying principles and beliefs that shape the way a military forces conducts its operations. It can change when technological advances are incorporated in military equipment, when society's values are altered or when there is a fundamental shift in international relations. Military doctrine foreshadows



the methods and modes of future military practices and serves to guide commanders and planners in the employment of military force.<sup>62</sup> In addition, doctrine provides a structure from which to evaluate past military operations and future planned contingency plans. Doctrine is fundamental for organized military operations and is used in this paper to determine whether the same force should be planned for use for both permissive and opposed entry operations.

U.S. military doctrine expanded in the area of operations other than war after the fall of the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989. National security was no longer focused on deterring Soviet aggression but instead focused on the changing international security environment. Today, U.S. national security is framed by the challenges created by the spread of ethnic conflict, by rogue states, by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and by political instability that results from environmental degradation and rapid population growth.<sup>63</sup> U.S. Joint Doctrine now includes MOOTW to focus attention on the increasing role these missions have on the military power today.<sup>64</sup> Among the operations that provided insight into the post Cold War security environment was Operation URGENT FURY. It, along with Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, will be evaluated against the doctrine for military operations other than war that has emerged in the 1990s.

Current U.S. joint military doctrine establishes the range of military operations. The two overall groupings are war and operations other than war. Operations other than war are predominantly characterized by noncombat, although some combat operations are considered within the category.<sup>65</sup> A sub-category of operations other than war is Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force. These operations are

characterized by deterioration of peace in a country or region, with military goals "to support national objectives, deter war and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that U.S. forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace."<sup>66</sup> Interventions of this type are normally conducted as a show of force to demonstrate U.S. resolve during an international crisis. Operations to deter, such as Operations VIGILANT WARRIOR and VIGILANT ENDEAVOR, the post Persian Gulf War deployments to Southwest Asia, are examples of show of force operations. Each involved the potential use of force to deter Iraq. The primary emphasis of this type of operation is to compel compliance through force if necessary. An operation that requires the establishment of an airhead when there is not a state of war, is also a military operation other than war involving the use or threat of force.<sup>67</sup> Both Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY fall in this category.

The purpose of Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was to reestablish order in the absence of a legitimate government authority and the means to establish lodgment in each country were essentially the same. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was conducted to enforce the terms of agreement between a legitimate head of state and the leader of a military coup d'etat. U.S. forces were introduced into Haiti on a peace enforcement operation and were to later transition peacekeeping duties to a U.N. force. In the case of URGENT FURY, the primary purpose for conducting the operation was to evacuate U.S. citizens from the island after a coup d'etat.<sup>68</sup> The operation included enabling operations by U.S. forces to reestablish order and transition to peacekeeping operations under the auspices of forces from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).<sup>69</sup>

A noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) as planned in Grenada, is a specific type of operation that may require the establishment of an airhead. Characterized by uncertainty, NEO operations "may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country's government, reoriented political or military relationship with the United States..." NEO involves temporary occupation of objectives and ends with a planned withdrawal. It is normally swift and should involve a minimum number of forces.<sup>70</sup> NEO was not a factor for securing lodgment for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, U.S. and other protected citizens were offered evacuation prior to military operations; it was a primary factor and concern for Operation URGENT FURY.

An airhead is "a designated location in an area of operations used as a base for supply and evacuation by air."<sup>71</sup> For both Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY the first priority was to establish an airhead. Point Salines airfield was selected for the airhead on Grenada and Port au Prince International Airport on Haiti. It was assumed that both airfields were defended during the planning of both operations. From this assumption developed the requirement for an airfield seizure at each location.

The purpose for an airfield seizure is to have a secure airhead where follow-on forces may be airlanded into the operational area.<sup>72</sup> The Air Force prefers airland delivery over aerial delivery for several reasons. First, the equipment and personnel are more safely delivered to the objective area. Second, more people and heavier equipment loads are possible with airland deliveries. Third, personnel and equipment arrive intact and consolidated at the objective area. Fourth, airland deliveries make available aircraft space for movement of personnel and equipment out of the objective area. Finally, airland delivery requires less specialized equipment to deliver the cargo.<sup>73</sup>

To establish airland operations at an uncontrolled airfield, that is, an airfield that does not have a manned and operating control tower, the Air Force requires a combat control team (CCT) to provide air traffic control of the air terminal airspace during continuous airland operations. The CCT arrives in a number of different ways, from covert infiltration to high altitude low opening parachutist techniques.<sup>74</sup> For airborne assault operations, they are normally part of the joint airborne advance party (JAAP).<sup>75</sup> Upon arrival, the CCT locates, identifies and marks the drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ) for follow on airborne assault or airland operations.<sup>76</sup>

Security of the airfield is the primary purpose of the entry force. Upon securing initial objectives at the airfield, entry forces seize and defend key terrain around the airfield that dominate likely avenues of approach for an enemy force. Follow on airland missions buildup the entry force and allow a wider security zone for the airhead. The entry force can be transported three different ways by air: airborne assault, air assault or airland.<sup>77</sup> Airborne assault is used primarily for air field seizure operations.

When conducting airfield seizure, the key element is surprise.<sup>78</sup> Surprise can be achieved by a variety of means: operations security, speed of the assault operation and follow on force buildup, or through deception that sets the conditions in which the enemy becomes aware of the assault operation too late to effectively coordinate a defense.<sup>79</sup> Airborne forces rely on the night to achieve surprise and time the assault so that initial follow on echelons arrive before daylight.<sup>80</sup> For both Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, operational surprise could not be achieved, however, tactical surprise was maximized in accordance with doctrine with planned assaults covered by

night operations.<sup>81</sup> Surprise, however, is not a principle of MOOTW operations. Instead, it is found in the tactical doctrine for airborne forces.

Closely tied to the initial objective of securing a base of operations, is the concern for restraint. One of the principles of MOOTW, restraint implies the judicious use of force while conducting military operations.<sup>82</sup> It is closely linked legitimacy. Too much force used during entry operations can enhance the legitimacy of the opposing force and undermine the legitimacy of the intervening force. Excessive force in the initial phase of an operation, while helping to achieve tactical success, can ultimately “attract a response in kind, heighten tension, polarize public opinion against the operation and participants, foreclose negotiating opportunities, prejudice the perceived impartiality of the peace operation force, and escalate the overall level of violence.”<sup>83</sup>

A method of showing restraint in entry operations is to arrive with overwhelming force. While not a principle of MOOTW, it is a consideration for forcible entry and is closely linked to the joint principles of war of mass and economy of force. Mass is concentrating effects to achieve decisive results, economy of force is the judicious employment of forces.<sup>84</sup> Airborne forces have limited tactical mobility, but achieve the effects of mass by remaining within the area they initially assault. Depending on the objective size, airborne assaults are economy of force operations due to their limited organic fire support capabilities.<sup>85</sup> Overwhelming force, on the other hand, “is the concentration of combat power required to successfully establish an airhead or beachhead in the face of armed opposition.”<sup>86</sup> For airborne assaults, the Air Force is the primary source of fire support.<sup>87</sup> It can play a supporting role in achieving overwhelming force simply by flying near the objective area.

Rapidly establishing a significant and visible military presence is essential to the notion of restraint.<sup>88</sup> Forces intervening in a country that appear too lightly armed or too lightly supported can embolden the resistance of an opposing force. Overwhelming force has its place in MOOTW operations and precludes provoking a violent response by a show of force to "display U.S. resolve and commitment, to protect U.S. or indigenous lives and property, or to accomplish other critical objectives."<sup>89</sup>

Of paramount concern for commanders of MOOTW operations are the rules of engagement the assault force must abide by. In all operations, soldiers have the right to self defense.<sup>90</sup> Airfield seizure operations are conducted in conjunction with military operations other than war involving the use or threat of use of force. When conducted with a peace enforcement operation, forces engaged in airfield seizures must retain enough latitude to accomplish the mission without undue risk to themselves but must be limited so there is not any undue destruction of the belligerent forces.<sup>91</sup> Determining the rules of engagement derives its legal basis from the authority in which the intervention is conducted. A U.N. Chapter VII intervention allows broad interpretation by the combatant commander in how much force is required.<sup>92</sup> Similarly, interventions that are a result of a regional security organization are bounded by the degree of freedom provided to the combatant commander.

Both Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY were sanctioned by international bodies and included in their charters, operations to restore order. Operations to restore order are defined by their intent. "They are designed to return an unstable and lawless environment to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and restore civil authority."<sup>93</sup> Sanctioning by an

international body provides the legitimacy for a peace enforcement operation. President Clinton codified U.S. policy for seeking authority for military operations from the U.N. or from a regional security organization and U.N. Security Council before U.S. commitment of forces to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. In addition, he included specific factors which the U.S. will weigh when determining whether to participate. These include the provision that sufficient forces will be used to achieve the clearly defined objectives.<sup>94</sup>

Current doctrine describes the difference between peace enforcement operations and peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations are "military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of a agreement." Peace enforcement operations are "the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."<sup>95</sup> Where peacekeeping forces are lightly armed, peace enforcement forces bring the required combat power to execute their mission. The difference can be stark. A peace enforcement force is prepared to inflict and sustain casualties. A peace enforcement operation is planned and executed the same as any combat operation.<sup>96</sup> For these reasons, doctrine cautions against attempting to transition a peace enforcement force to a peacekeeping mission.<sup>97</sup>

Doctrine provides a vehicle for analysis of whether the same force should be employed for forcible entry or unopposed entry. Case studies Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY provide the test. Under current doctrine, both operations are categorized as military operations other than war involving the use or threat

of force. To enter both countries and conduct military operations a lodgment had to be established. NEO was a factor for both operations, but only Operation URGENT FURY required NEO at the time of execution. For each, an airhead needed to be established and each had the requirement for airfield seizure in the event diplomatic efforts to obtain unopposed entry failed. Both operations required an advance party to prepare the drop zone or landing zone for follow on airland operations. In both cases, the primary objective for the entry force was to secure lodgment at the airfield and provide security for follow on airland traffic. Surprise for the airfield seizure was planned into each operation by taking advantage of night operations. In each case timing the assault was critical for achieving follow on tactical objectives. Each operation claimed its legitimacy through resolutions from regional or international and regional security organizations. Each operation intended to capitalize on overwhelming force to intimidate the adversary. Initial rules of engagement were commensurate with a peace enforcement mission and each operation had a transition force for peacekeeping.

The strategic environment was very different in 1983 compared to 1994. In 1983 the strategic concerns over the relations between the U.S. and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its satellites were paramount. In 1994, by contrast, the strategic concerns for the U.S. were predominantly economic and included a dramatic military force structure drawdown. At the tactical level, however, the methods used by the United States military to conduct forcible entry operations with a follow on mission to restore order in 1983 were not dramatically different from the same operation in 1994.




#### IV. ANALYSIS

Planners for both Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY had to find equilibrium between several opposing concepts expressed by the principles of MOOTW and the principles of war. The political intent of each mission was to foster legitimate democratic government as a method of stabilizing society. This desire by the United States did not lend itself to reliance on firepower to accomplish the objective of each intervention. The introduction of traditional elements of combat power alone to an already volatile situation could provoke a violent reaction contrary to the intended mission.<sup>98</sup> For this reason, the initial activities to gain lodgment are critical and their appearance must be carefully orchestrated. An expected and unopposed entry is the best case scenario to plan for entry of military forces. This was the situation that faced the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia in December, 1995 after the signing of peace agreements between opposing ethnic groups. Unfortunately stability operations are not always the result of peace agreements. More often, conditions that require U.S. military intervention are the result of instability caused by military coups. In these scenarios, it is uncertain whether entry will be opposed and it is necessary to plan for a scenario requiring forcible entry to insure adequate security for the entry force. In both Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY the instability in the target country was heightened by uncertainty about the loyalty and control of military and paramilitary forces within a country. Planners had to contend with a situation that required contingency options for either opposed or unopposed entry.

Attaining lodgment under conditions of uncertainty poses a dilemma to planners for operations other than war. When the intent of an operation is to provide stability, force application may exacerbate an already unstable condition.<sup>99</sup> An opposed or uncertain scenario requires one to consider the means to protect the entry forces as well as the means to subdue opposition. Security of the force in this situation requires the use of combat power or the threat of its use to discourage resistance.<sup>100</sup> However, the application of too excessive force destroys the notion of restraint and prejudices the legitimacy of the operation. Conversely, too little force can be provocative and may encourage resistance.

Balancing the principles of MOOTW and the principles of war becomes the planner's most vexing problem in a scenario where opposition to the entry force is uncertain. This balance can be shown graphically between the various elements:



There is inherent tension described in this graphic. None of the elements by themselves can balance on the center—each requires a counterbalance from the other elements. Just

as in the graphic, the principles of MOOTW and war are in tension with each other. Too much emphasis on one element can undermine an entire operation.

Planning operations to secure lodgment requires one to analyze the means and the method used, based on accepted principles. The assumptions made in the planning phase determines the emphasis placed on individual principles. For MOOTW operations, establishing lodgment is the enabling event for the intervention in another country. In MOOTW scenarios, planners must initially assess whether entry will be opposed or unopposed. This assessment is a key assumption for the operational plan. When the assumption of unopposed entry cannot be made, then the plan must account for the possibility that entry will be opposed. Opposed entry requires combat force to secure lodgment. A primary concern becomes the security of the entry force itself. Security in an uncertain environment can be achieved through a variety of means—surprise, deception, mass, overwhelming force, or a combination of these principles. The counterbalance to these principles are the principles of restraint and legitimacy.

The U.S. military entered Grenada in 1983 uncertain whether their operations would be opposed, but with an expectation that the probability of opposition was high. The airfield seizure operation at Point Salines airfield during the initial hours of Operation URGENT FURY relied on surprise achieved through night operations and synchronization to provide security for the entry force.<sup>101</sup> Swift insertion of the entry force were planned to overwhelm and neutralize resistance at the airfield. As the Rangers began executing the airfield seizure plan, however, short notice tactical mission changes, poor intelligence and poor coordination desynchronized their operation from the onset.

The airfield seizure plan required the bulk of the entry force to land and unload at the airfield at night. Commanders determined that the successful insertion of the joint airborne advance party (JAAP) to provide the necessary navigation and landing aids for the main body was a critical event and focused their attention on accomplishing this task. After two failed attempts to insert the JAAP, H-hour should have been delayed an additional 24 hours to accommodate a third attempt, or else the plan should have been changed to an airborne assault for the entire entry force.<sup>102</sup> Instead, to compensate for the absence of the advance party, a pathfinder element was inserted at 0330 which forced an H-hour delay of an hour and a half to 0500.<sup>103</sup> This delay robbed the operation of its primary means of security, surprise afforded by night operations.

The two Ranger battalions used to attain lodgment at Point Salines airfield were capable of either opposed or unopposed entry. If unopposed, the majority covertly land at the airfield and rapidly offload themselves, their vehicles and their equipment. If opposed or if the runway was unsuitable for landing, their contingency plan was to conduct a mass airborne assault into the airfield, subdue the opposition if required and clear the runway for follow on forces. A contingency requiring an airborne assault was not considered likely at departure time. The decision to shift from airland insertion to airborne assault of the entire entry force was made after the aircraft were enroute to the objective area. Misunderstood communications between and within the aircraft caused many of the Rangers to be late in donning their parachute equipment. The lead aircraft navigation system malfunction and the reorganizing of the formation to be in position to conduct single ship approaches to the dropzone robbed the Rangers of the mass required for a

forcible entry. The piecemeal insertion of the force was provoking rather than intimidating and resistance at the airfield was stronger than anticipated.<sup>104</sup>

A fundamental requirement in establishing an airhead is the rapid arrival of follow on forces.<sup>105</sup> The follow on echelon at Point Salines was the 82nd Airborne Division which was expected to arrive at sunrise. Their planned arrival at first light added additional mass to consolidate the gains made in the night. To arrive at the required time, the aircraft carrying the paratroopers needed to be in the air prior to the actual airfield seizure. However, the lead aircraft allocated to the 82nd Airborne Division move to Grenada was not even loaded until after the airfield was secured. The first C-141 carrying 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne troops arrived at 1405 local time, eight hours after the airfield was secure and the originally scheduled 0800 local arrival time.<sup>106</sup>

The plan for the airfield seizure at Point Salines airfield was rigid, precluding any flexibility in the conduct of the operation. Timing was critical for success. To insure that the airfield seizure was accomplished according to plan, commanders focused on the initial step of inserting the joint airborne advance party. The attention paid to the opening event of the operation cost them time for the rest of the mission and forced the Ranger force off of their timetable. The insertion of the JAAP was not essential for the Rangers' contingency plan to secure Point Salines. The C-130s carrying the Rangers were capable of finding the drop zone without the additional aids needed for follow on airland operations. The fact that planners were concerned that navigation problems could cause the late arrival of the Rangers shows the critical nature of proper timing for the operation.<sup>107</sup> The insertion of the advance party became the central factor for the timing of the assault. If the primary means for airfield seizure was airborne assault, the insertion

of the JAAP would not have been a critical event and cause of the H-hour delay. It was still possible to complete an airfield assessment prior to the first airland mission if the entire force, to include the JAAP, conducted an airborne assault at the original H-hour. Events that preceded the airfield seizure worked against the Rangers' plan and though the Rangers were flexible enough to airborne assault into their objective, they were forced to conduct a forcible entry in daylight negating their advantage of surprise.

Where Operation URGENT FURY was rigid, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was flexible due the concept of adaptive force packaging. Planners for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY learned the lessons for establishing lodgment that came out of Grenada and Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. Neither operation became the model for the operation in Haiti, though. Operation JUST CAUSE relied exclusively on forcible entry operations at both Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport and Rio Hato Airfield. Both entry forces conducted mass airborne assaults.<sup>108</sup> Night operations and overwhelming force provided security for the force. Follow on forces landed at first light immediately after the airfields were secure in accordance with airborne doctrine. During JUST CAUSE there was no contingency for airland deployment of the entry force as in Operation URGENT FURY. While the overall operation in Panama was complex, providing the entry force with a single mode for conducting the airfield seizure, simplified the decision process and better synchronized the plan. The techniques employed for Operation JUST CAUSE became the starting point for OPLAN 2370-95, the forcible entry plan for Haiti.

Unlike Operations URGENT FURY and JUST CAUSE, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY assigned the mission to secure lodgment to two separate forces. While

the objective was the same for each force, the method of employment used by each was different--JTF-180 would conduct an airborne assault while JTF-190 would air assault by helicopter. Even though the UNSC Resolution 940 provided the mandate to use all means necessary to remove the military leadership from Haiti, concern for Haitian popular support for the U.S. intervention required the U.S. military forces show restraint in establishing lodgment.<sup>109</sup> Showing restraint from the beginning of the operation was vital to maintaining legitimacy. However, there was a real security concern for U.S. military forces because of uncertainty about the response of Haitian Army (Fad'H) and other paramilitary forces to the U.S. led intervention.<sup>110</sup>

The premise of OPLAN 2370-95 was that intervention by the U.S. military in Haiti would be resisted. This was the worst case scenario and was fully developed before other military alternatives were considered.<sup>111</sup> For the scenario, the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division was given the central role of establishing lodgment through forcible entry into Port au Prince International Airport. Though OPLAN 2370-95 was designed to support a military operation other than war, it was planned with a force trained and prepared to conduct combat operations.<sup>112</sup> JTF-180 planned to conduct a mass airborne assault, similar to that conducted during Operation JUST CAUSE. Paratroopers would conduct a nighttime airborne assault and airfield seizure to secure lodgment for follow on airland missions carrying the sustainment forces for the peace enforcement operation. The forcible entry operation was a primary combat mission for the 82nd Airborne Division.

The original concept for U.S. intervention in Haiti was for U.S. military forces to unilaterally oust the Cedras regime and stabilize the country prior to the U.N. or multi national peacekeeping operation. The passage of UNSC Resolution 940 provided a

political reason to consider an alternative option to intervene without conducting a forcible entry. OPLAN 2380-95 was for the unopposed insertion of a multinational peacekeeping force. It was planned around a separate force, JTF-190 (the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division), who would establish lodgment by an air assault of the security force into Port au Prince International Airport from a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier positioned off the coast. With the security force in place, follow on peace enforcement forces would airland and expand the airhead for the peace enforcement mission.

In combination, the two plans provided dynamic flexibility to the Joint Task Force Commander. He could employ JTF-180 and JTF-190 singly or in combination depending on the threat.<sup>113</sup> More importantly, however, he had credible combat force available to coerce the Cedras regime to relinquish power. The two task forces in combination provided the necessary security for the MOOTW, provided visible mass and overwhelming force to the Cedras regime, but showed restraint to the Haitian people--a balance of principles for an operation to secure lodgment in a MOOTW environment.

In the end, coercion was the only position from which the U.S. could negotiate effectively with General Cedras. The threat of an invasion by U.S. military forces had to be a reality to Cedras and backed up by real combat force. JTF-180 provided that combat force. Not until the formation of aircraft carrying the 82nd Airborne Division was airborne did the Carter-Nunn-Powell team receive assurances that U.S. intervention would be unopposed. The combination of a force prepared to forcibly enter the country coupled with a force offshore poised for a less aggressive security mission for unopposed entry provided the overwhelming force and restraint balance required to retain legitimacy for the operation and security for the forces employed for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.



## **V. CONCLUSION**

Securing lodgment at an airfield in an environment where it is uncertain whether the introduction of military forces will be opposed during a military operation other than war poses a difficult problem for planners of military operations. Forcible entry operations are combat missions to wrest control of the lodgment cite from the opposing force. These operations use the principles of mass, surprise and overwhelming combat power to secure the point of entry and facilitate the rapid introduction of additional military forces.

Unopposed entry to an airfield to secure lodgment can be achieved less aggressively with less provocative means. Landing a security force at the airfield appears benign compared to either airborne assault or air assault techniques. However, in an uncertain environment, the tension between security of the force, restraint and legitimacy provides operational planners a problem in risk management. The method selected for insertion of the entry force telegraphs the intent of the mission, whether combat, peace enforcement, or peacekeeping.

This study cited two MOOTW case studies for entry operations at airfields required to secure lodgment to determine if the same force could be used to secure lodgment whether opposed or unopposed. Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983) and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994) were both stability operations, though Operation URGENT FURY began as a non-combatant evacuation operation. In each operation opposition to the entry force was uncertain. In Operation URGENT FURY the same force was programmed to conduct either opposed or unopposed entry. In Operation

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the mission to conduct opposed entry operations was given to one joint task force while the mission to conduct unopposed entry operations was given to another joint task force.

The threat faced by entry force in each case study dictated the amount of emphasis the individual principles of MOOTW the principles of war were given by planners. In Grenada, there was a high probability that entry of U.S. forces would be resisted. To minimize the threat at Point Salines airfield, the airfield seizure was planned to take place at night to maximize surprise. To accomplish the airland insertion of the entry force, an advance party was required to reconnoiter, clear and prepare navigation and landing aids for the airfield that was still under construction. Success was predicated on a complicated set of preconditions: successful covert insertion of the advance party, the clearing and setting up of an unobstructed landing zone at the airfield, and covert landing of the entry force under the cover of night. Failure to achieve any of these preconditions necessitated a change in the mode of entry from airland to airborne assault.

The Ranger operation at Point Salines airfield illustrates the need to plan flexibility into an operation when the same force is used to conduct either opposed or unopposed entry. Rather than plan and conduct operations for the worst case scenario, the Rangers' assault relied on the successful establishment of conditions for unopposed entry.

Approaching the problem from the opposite assumption, that entry will be opposed, drives the planner to consider airborne assault as the primary mode for entry and strips away all the preconditions for success except for the requirement for night operations to maximize surprise. This mode of entry takes away the option to airland forces until the airfield seizure is complete, but at the same time it simplifies the operation affording greater

flexibility in its execution. It does not provide the perception of restraint by the entry force and may be considered too aggressive for many MOOTW missions.

Balancing the principles of MOOTW and the principles of war for operations to secure lodgment requires careful consideration of the threat and the means of negating that threat. Credible resolve to follow through with military operations forcibly enter a country if required is an essential element of achieving unopposed entry. This resolve can be portrayed in a variety of ways; diplomatic resolutions and economic sanctions are methods of showing resolve. Militarily, the demonstration of the means which can be employed to secure lodgment if opposed may successfully secure acquiescence to unopposed entry. This was what happened in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the second case study examined.

For Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JTF-180 was assigned the mission to conduct forcible entry operations into Port au Prince International Airport. JTF-190 was given a complementary mission to conduct entry into the same location in a permissive environment. Each task force was trained for a specific method for securing lodgment—JTF-180 through airborne assault, JTF-190 through air assault or airland insertion from helicopters. The combination of both joint task forces provided the leverage for successful diplomatic efforts to gain assurances from General Cedras that military intervention would not be opposed by his forces. Having the ability and intent to conduct an airfield seizure by a massive airborne assault force was an enabling event for establishing unopposed lodgment at Port au Prince International Airport. The concept of adaptive force packaging employed during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY provided

coercive military power coupled with restraint to secure the conditions for unopposed entry into Haiti.

Unlike Operation URGENT FURY, where the Rangers were tasked to conduct either airland or airborne assault entry depending on the conditions at arrival time at the objective area, JTF-190 initially deployed from the continental United States with the single mode of entry into Haiti of airborne assault. When the invasion force was recalled, the JTF-190 entry force returned to its departure point, received its change in mission and re-embarked to Haiti for permissive entry.

The decision to use the same force for permissive or opposed entry operations to secure lodgment depends on the nature of the military operation. When coercive military force is coupled with ongoing diplomatic efforts, as in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, surprise is not a principle that has much applicability since the threat of invasion must be perceived as immanent. In such cases, two separate entry forces, one dedicated to opposed entry and the other dedicated to permissive entry, are most effective in achieving the desired effect of unopposed entry to secure lodgment. Conversely, if surprise and rapid execution are required to secure lodgment at an airfield, such as in the case of Operation URGENT FURY, then a single force dedicated to an airborne assault and airfield seizure is the most effective method of securing lodgment. While the same force can be used to secure lodgment at an airfield under conditions of uncertainty of whether entry will be opposed, planners must assume the worst case and be prepared to conduct an airfield seizure operation by airborne assault as the primary mode of entering the country. This option may be unacceptable based on the purpose of the operation because it does not show restraint by the intervening force.

The US National Security Strategy acknowledges the unique interventionist capability for US military forces.<sup>114</sup> Nested in National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy emphasizes that US forces must be capable of deploying and operating across the spectrum of conflict at all points on the globe.<sup>115</sup> Within the spectrum of conflict are military operations other than war. These operations may require the U.S. to deploy troops initially to establish lodgment for follow on operations. How the military conducts its operation to establish lodgment signals the intent of the intervention. Too much force is belligerent, while too little imperils the security of the deployed troops. Uncertainty on whether U.S. military intervention will be opposed or not adds to the difficulty of balancing the principles of MOOTW and the principles of war. The most effective plan will be flexible enough to handle either opposed or unopposed operations. In certain cases, entry forces dedicated to one or the other contingency will be required. Neither Operations URGENT FURY and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY can be templates for future MOOTW contingencies. However, each provides lessons for selecting the types of forces required to conduct interventions and the considerations planners must address to produce a flexible and balanced operational plan.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, Washington D.C.: The White House, 1995), p. 7.
- <sup>2</sup> Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 23 March 1994), p. 264. This paper will use joint terminology to reference MOOTW, U.S. Army doctrine refers to MOOTW as simply operations other than war (OOTW).
- <sup>3</sup> National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 1995), p.4.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid., Chairman's cover letter.
- <sup>5</sup> President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 23.
- <sup>6</sup> Operation JUST CAUSE is not included in this analysis since the United States retains basing rights in Panama and already had U.S. military forces established in country prior to the operation.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 16 Jun 1995), p. GL-3.
- <sup>8</sup> The World Fact Book, (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1991), pp. 120-121.
- <sup>9</sup> Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada: An Eyewitness Account of the U.S. Invasion and the Caribbean History That Provoked It, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1984), p. 76.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 69 through 70.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 105 through 106.
- <sup>12</sup> Lee R. Russell & M. Albert Mendez, Grenada 1983, (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1985), pp. 3-5.
- <sup>13</sup> Peter M. Dunn & Bruce W. Watson, ed. American Intervention in Grenada, The Implications of Operation "URGENT FURY" (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 100-101.

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- <sup>14</sup> Reynold A. Burrowes, Revolution and Rescue in Grenada. An Account of the U.S.-Caribbean Invasion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 79.
- <sup>15</sup> FM 101-5-1 (final draft), Operational Terms and Graphics, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 July 1995), p. 1-125.
- <sup>16</sup> FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1990), p. 7-10.
- <sup>17</sup> Major Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury, The Battle for Grenada, (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 118.
- <sup>18</sup> O'Shaughnessy, p. 246.
- <sup>19</sup> Adkin, p. 111.
- <sup>20</sup> Russell & Mendez, p. 11.
- <sup>21</sup> Adkin, pp. 143 through 144.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp. 168 through 170.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 168 through 169.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 169 through 170.
- <sup>25</sup> Russell & Mendez, p. 11.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 11.
- <sup>27</sup> Adkin, p. 170.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 197 through 198.
- <sup>29</sup> Russell & Mendez, p. 17.
- <sup>30</sup> Russell & Mendez, p. 14.
- <sup>31</sup> Adkin, p. 203.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 208 through 212.
- <sup>33</sup> Russell & Mendez, p. 21.

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- <sup>34</sup> Adkin, p.221.
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 223 through 224.
- <sup>36</sup> United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY JAAR, United States Atlantic Command (Norfolk, VA: United States Atlantic Command, 1995), p. 6.
- <sup>37</sup> LTC Stephen M. Epstein, LTC Robert S. Cronin & Col James G. Pulley, "JTF Haiti: A United Nations Foreign Internal Defense Mission," Special Warfare, July 1994, p.3.
- <sup>38</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Operations in Haiti, Planning/Preparation/Execution, August 1994 thru January 1995, (Fort Drum, NY: 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, 1995), p.1-4.
- <sup>39</sup> United States Atlantic Command, "Planning for Operations in Haiti, Lessons Learned From Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY", briefing slides presented to the US Army Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellows at the United States Atlantic Command, 4 December 1995, by USACOM J5 Special Planning Group. p. 4.
- <sup>40</sup> United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, pp. 7 through 8.
- <sup>41</sup> United States Atlantic Command, "Planning for Operations in Haiti, Lessons Learned From Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY", p. 4.
- <sup>42</sup> LTC James L. Dunn & Maj Jon M. Custer, "Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of the SOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force," Special Warfare, July 1995, pp. 26 through 27.
- <sup>43</sup> USACOM, "JTF 180/MNF Azimuth Check", briefing slides from a brief given to USACOM in late September 1994.
- <sup>44</sup> United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, p. 7.
- <sup>45</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, p. 5-3.
- <sup>46</sup> President William J. Clinton, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1994), p. 4. The criteria set forth in this document are: 1) U.N. involvement advances U.S. interests and there is international support; 2) there is a sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights; 3) there are clear objectives and a common understanding that the mission is peacekeeping or peace enforcement; 4) for (Chapter VI) peacekeeping operations a cease fire is in place; 5) for peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations there is a threat to international peace and security is considered significant; 6) the means to accomplish the mission are available, including forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission; 7) the political, economic and humanitarian



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consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable; 8) the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

<sup>47</sup> United States Atlantic Command, Joint After Action Report, p. 8.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. pp. 7-8.

<sup>49</sup> Dunn & Custer, p. 30.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p.8.

<sup>51</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, p. 5-20.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 5-3.

<sup>53</sup> Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Joint After Action Report, p. 8.

<sup>54</sup> LTC Raoul Archambault III, "Joint Operations in Haiti", Army, Vol. 45, No. 11, November 1995, pp.23 through 29.

<sup>55</sup> Dunn & Custer, p. 30.

<sup>56</sup> 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, p. 5-20.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p. 5-25.

<sup>58</sup> Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Joint After Action Report, p. 10.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p.12.

<sup>60</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C.: HQ Department of the Army, Jun 1993), pp. 2-4 through 2-6.

<sup>61</sup> Draft U.S. Army Pub 90-xx, Forcible Entry, (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Oct 1993), pp. I-4 through I-9.

<sup>62</sup> Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington D.C.:The Joint Staff, 10 January 1995), pp. I-1 through I-3.

<sup>63</sup> President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. i.

<sup>64</sup> Joint Pub 1, p. I-7.

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<sup>65</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 1 February 1995), p. I-3.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. I-3 through I-4.

<sup>67</sup> Airhead is defined as "a designated in a hostile or threatened area which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation." From Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 23 March 1994), p. 17.

<sup>68</sup> George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, My Years as Secretary of State, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), pp. 323 through 330.

<sup>69</sup> Adkin, p. 219.

<sup>70</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 16 Jun 1993), p. III-2 through III-3.

<sup>71</sup> Joint Pub 1-02, p. 35.

<sup>72</sup> FM 90-26, Airborne Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, December 1990), p. 7-10.

<sup>73</sup> AFDD 30, Airlift Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 28 April 1995), p. 9.

<sup>74</sup> Joint Pub 3-17, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 18 July 1995), p. VI-15.

<sup>75</sup> FM 90-26, p. 7-11.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., p. A-1.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 3-13 through 3-15.

<sup>78</sup> FM 90-26, p. 7-10.

<sup>79</sup> Draft U.S. Army Pub 90-xx, p. I-9.

<sup>80</sup> FM 90-26, p. 7-10.

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<sup>81</sup> For Operation URGENT FURY, the airborne assault at Point Salines was scheduled for 0200, 23 Oct 1983; for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the airborne assault was scheduled for 0001, 19 Sep 1994. Sources: Adkin, p. 195 and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Initial Impressions Haiti D-20 to D+40, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1994), p. xvii.

<sup>82</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, p. II-4.

<sup>83</sup> FM 100-23, Peace Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994), p. 33.

<sup>84</sup> Joint Pub 3-0, p. A-1.

<sup>85</sup> FM 90-26, p. 1-6.

<sup>86</sup> Draft U.S. Army Pub 90-xx, p. I-6.

<sup>87</sup> FM 90-26, p. 1-6.

<sup>88</sup> FM 100-23, p. 7.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 17

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>91</sup> Draft Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, (Washington D.C.: The Joint Staff, 15 April 1996), p. III-9.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p. C-9.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. III-3.

<sup>94</sup> President William J. Clinton, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, pp. 5 through 6.

<sup>95</sup> Joint Pub 3-07, pp. III-12 through III-13.

<sup>96</sup> Draft Joint Pub 3-07.3, p. III-5

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., pp. I-7 through I-9.

<sup>98</sup> FM 100-23, p. v.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

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- <sup>100</sup> Ibid., p. 17.
- <sup>101</sup> FM 90-26, p. 7-10 prescribes that "the assault of an airfield should be conducted at night to maximize the surprise, security, and protection of the force."
- <sup>102</sup> Draft FM 90-xx, p. IV-27 prescribes insertion of the JAAP at a minimum 24 hours prior to the assault by the main body. FM 90-26, p. 7-13 is less emphatic on this matter stating that "if surprise is paramount, the airborne force may rely on other means to pinpoint the objective area and on other sources of intelligence and navigation."
- <sup>103</sup> Adkin, p. 202.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid., pp. 208 through 212.
- <sup>105</sup> FM 90-26, p. 3-4.
- <sup>106</sup> Adkin, p. 221.
- <sup>107</sup> Ibid., p. 167.
- <sup>108</sup> Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause, the Storming of Panama, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 191 through 213 and 335 through 340.
- <sup>109</sup> Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Joint After Action Report, p. 10.
- <sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 13.
- <sup>111</sup> Patrecia Slayden Hollis, "Projecting America's Military Might," Field Artillery, April 1995, p. 7.
- <sup>112</sup> Ibid., p. 6.
- <sup>113</sup> 10th Mountain Division, p. 5-16.
- <sup>114</sup> President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, p. 8.
- <sup>115</sup> National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995, p. 7.

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